deep-interview
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In the
Autoresearch_Modesection, the skill constructs and runs a shell command:omc autoresearch --mission "<mission>" --eval "<evaluator>". Themissionandevaluatorcomponents are derived directly from user input during the interview process. This presents a command injection risk if the user provides shell metacharacters or malicious scripts that the underlying tool does not properly sanitize. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an Indirect Prompt Injection surface. It ingests untrusted user input during the Socratic interview loop and incorporates it into a final specification file (
.omc/specs/deep-interview-{slug}.md). This specification is then used as the primary instruction source for downstream autonomous skills likeomc-plan,autopilot, andralphvia theSkill()bridge. - Ingestion points: User input from
{{ARGUMENTS}}and interview responses. - Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the prompts to separate user content from system instructions.
- Capability inventory: File writing (
Write), shell command execution (omc autoresearch), and invocation of other high-capability agents (Skill()). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the user's answers is mentioned before they are written to the specification file.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a sub-agent (
oh-my-claudecode:explore) to systematically map the local codebase in 'brownfield' scenarios. While this is an intended feature for context gathering, it involves automated file system access and metadata extraction.
Audit Metadata