deep-interview

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 11, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: In the Autoresearch_Mode section, the skill constructs and runs a shell command: omc autoresearch --mission "<mission>" --eval "<evaluator>". The mission and evaluator components are derived directly from user input during the interview process. This presents a command injection risk if the user provides shell metacharacters or malicious scripts that the underlying tool does not properly sanitize.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an Indirect Prompt Injection surface. It ingests untrusted user input during the Socratic interview loop and incorporates it into a final specification file (.omc/specs/deep-interview-{slug}.md). This specification is then used as the primary instruction source for downstream autonomous skills like omc-plan, autopilot, and ralph via the Skill() bridge.
  • Ingestion points: User input from {{ARGUMENTS}} and interview responses.
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the prompts to separate user content from system instructions.
  • Capability inventory: File writing (Write), shell command execution (omc autoresearch), and invocation of other high-capability agents (Skill()).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the user's answers is mentioned before they are written to the specification file.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a sub-agent (oh-my-claudecode:explore) to systematically map the local codebase in 'brownfield' scenarios. While this is an intended feature for context gathering, it involves automated file system access and metadata extraction.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 11, 2026, 09:20 AM