prototyping
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes 'Host steps' (questions and choices) from external sources or other agent interactions to build prototypes. This untrusted data is interpolated into
steps.jsand individual prototype HTML pages, creating a vulnerability surface if inputs contain malicious instructions or scripts. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Procedure steps 2, 3, 4) specifies that host questions, Wayfinder tickets, and plain choices are used as primary inputs. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a structured JavaScript manifest (
window.STEPS.push(...)) to delimit entries, but does not provide explicit instructions for sanitizing or escaping the content of host questions before interpolation. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to write files to the user's home directory (
~/.prototyping), execute shell scripts (scripts/serve.sh), and run a background Python HTTP server. - Sanitization: The provided shell (
assets/index.html) utilizestextContentfor rendering UI elements, which mitigates XSS risks in the shell's own interface. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The prototype shell (
assets/index.html) implements a polling mechanism that dynamically loads and executes thesteps.jsmanifest file as a script at regular intervals. Because the AI agent generates the content of this manifest based on potentially untrusted external inputs, this pattern represents a vector for executing injected content within the browser context of the prototype session. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes and executes a local shell script (
scripts/serve.sh) to manage the lifecycle of a Python-based HTTP server. The script is configured to bind strictly to the loopback interface (127.0.0.1), preventing external access to the served prototypes.
Audit Metadata