dossier-briefing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from the user and interpolates it into a Markdown document intended for consumption by other AI agents. Malicious instructions placed in the subject name could potentially manipulate downstream agents.
- Ingestion points: The
subjectandauthorCLI arguments indossier_briefing_core.pyare the primary points where untrusted data enters the context. - Boundary markers: The generated Markdown uses standard headers and comments (e.g.,
<!-- Briefing-Geruest ... -->), but lacks strong delimitation or instructions to downstream agents to ignore embedded commands within user-provided fields. - Capability inventory: The skill includes file-writing capabilities to the local disk via the
-oargument in the Python script. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, escaping, or validation of the input strings before they are written into the Markdown file.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core logic allows for the creation and overwriting of files on the local filesystem based on user-supplied paths via the
-oor--outputarguments. While this is the intended function of a dossier generator, it provides a vector for local file system interaction that should be scoped to prevent access to sensitive directories.
Audit Metadata