model-strategy
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides explicit instructions for the agent to access private SSH keys located in the
~/.ssh/directory. Evidence includes the command patternssh -i ~/.ssh/<key> <user>@<tailscale-ip>used to connect to remote model hosts. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The orchestration strategy includes paths for the agent to execute code on remote servers via SSH, as well as running local scripts from internal cache directories, such as
node "~/.claude/plugins/cache/openai-codex/codex/1.0.4/scripts/codex-companion.mjs". - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently directs the agent to use shell-based tools including
curl,ssh, andnodeto delegate tasks to external models and APIs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: User-supplied prompts enter the system as variables passed to external CLI tools and remote API calls.
- Boundary markers: The documentation lacks any delimiters (like XML tags or triple quotes) to wrap user input, increasing the risk that embedded instructions could be obeyed.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including file system access, network requests via
curl, and remote command execution viassh. - Sanitization: There is no instruction for the agent to sanitize, escape, or validate user-provided strings before they are interpolated into command-line arguments (e.g.,
companion-for-agy "research prompt").
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata