model-strategy

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 13, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill provides explicit instructions for the agent to access private SSH keys located in the ~/.ssh/ directory. Evidence includes the command pattern ssh -i ~/.ssh/<key> <user>@<tailscale-ip> used to connect to remote model hosts.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The orchestration strategy includes paths for the agent to execute code on remote servers via SSH, as well as running local scripts from internal cache directories, such as node "~/.claude/plugins/cache/openai-codex/codex/1.0.4/scripts/codex-companion.mjs".
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently directs the agent to use shell-based tools including curl, ssh, and node to delegate tasks to external models and APIs.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
  • Ingestion points: User-supplied prompts enter the system as variables passed to external CLI tools and remote API calls.
  • Boundary markers: The documentation lacks any delimiters (like XML tags or triple quotes) to wrap user input, increasing the risk that embedded instructions could be obeyed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses high-privilege capabilities including file system access, network requests via curl, and remote command execution via ssh.
  • Sanitization: There is no instruction for the agent to sanitize, escape, or validate user-provided strings before they are interpolated into command-line arguments (e.g., companion-for-agy "research prompt").
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Nov 13, 2026, 05:40 AM