story-import
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions designed to programmatically bypass user interaction requirements in secondary tools. In Phase 2 of SKILL.md, it explicitly directs the agent to drive the
story-long-analyzepipeline in a mode that hits a 'skip asking' path, effectively suppressing manual checkpoints and confirmations that would otherwise be presented to the user. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves processing untrusted novel text provided by users, which introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions hidden within imported books could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during analysis or project generation.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through file paths or raw text pasting as defined in Phase 1 of SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters used to wrap the imported text to warn the agent against executing embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including extensive file system access (creating/modifying directories and files) and the ability to trigger and influence other agent skills and sub-agents such as
chapter-extractorandstory-explorer. - Sanitization: The instructions do not define any sanitization, escaping, or validation steps for the content being imported from user-provided sources.
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