The Agent Skills Directory

[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The SKILL.md file contains a 'Boundary Declaration' section that explicitly instructs the agent to override safety guidelines. It states that the agent must not refuse to process content on the grounds of 'sensitivity' or 'discomfort' (e.g., domestic violence, infidelity, violence), claiming that refusal would stall the analysis pipeline. This is a direct attempt to bypass content safety filters.
[COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is vulnerable to path traversal. It uses a user-provided story title ('{书名}') to construct file system paths (e.g., '拆文库/{书名}/'). There are no instructions to sanitize or validate this input, allowing an attacker to provide a malicious title (e.g., using '../') to access or write files outside the intended directory.
[PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a high surface area for Indirect Prompt Injection. It ingests entire stories provided by users and processes them through multiple stages without using boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands. Malicious instructions hidden within the story text could be executed by the agent during the analysis process. (Internal Severity: LOW)

story-short-analyze