krt-document-forge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions as an ingestion point for untrusted binary documents (PDF and DOCX) which may contain malicious instructions (e.g., hidden text, metadata, or comments) designed to compromise the agent. This risk is managed through explicit guardrails in the safety model and a mandatory summarization and redaction workflow.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/convert_to_markdown.pyreads user-provided document files from the local filesystem. - Boundary markers:
references/safety.mdidentifies all document content as untrusted evidence and explicitly forbids the agent from following commands found within the documents. - Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
subprocess.runfor external tool execution (pdftotext, pip) and performs extensive filesystem operations to write converted artifacts and assets. - Sanitization:
references/summarization-policy.mdrequires the agent to inspect, classify, and redact content into a separate staging area before any information is promoted to a versionable summary. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: When the
--install-missingflag is utilized, the skill's Python script makes network requests to the official Python Package Index (PyPI) to download and upgrade libraries such aspypdf,pdfplumber, andPyMuPDF. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill manages a local Python virtual environment at runtime, installing dependencies as needed and dynamically modifying
sys.pathto load them. While used for established libraries, this mechanism allows for the execution of code downloaded at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill routinely executes external commands using
subprocess.run. This includes calling the systempdftotextutility for PDF extraction and thepipmodule for dependency management. These calls use sanitized paths and argument lists to prevent shell injection.
Audit Metadata