krt-word-illuminator

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes local system binaries including LibreOffice, pdftoppm, and the unshare utility for document conversion and rendering.
  • Evidence: Subprocess calls found in scripts/render_docx.py and scripts/check_runtime.py.
  • Context: These operations are core to the skill's function and are performed with security-focused parameters, such as using network namespaces (unshare --net) to prevent outgoing network access during untrusted file processing.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs dynamic module inspection to detect the presence of environment dependencies.
  • Evidence: Use of importlib.import_module in scripts/check_runtime.py to check for libraries like python-docx and jsonschema.
  • Context: This is a benign runtime environmental check. The skill explicitly forbids the automatic installation of missing dependencies, requiring manual user intervention for setup.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted document content and metadata which could contain malicious instructions.
  • Ingestion points: System reads DOCX structure and text via inspect_docx.py, edit_docx.py, and compare_docx.py.
  • Boundary markers: Instructions in SKILL.md and references/safety.md strictly define that all document data must be treated as untrusted input and never interpreted as instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Capability is limited to deterministic OOXML manipulation via the python-docx library and isolated rendering.
  • Sanitization: Implements schema validation for all structured inputs and a 'package admission' layer in lib/package_safety.py that verifies ZIP integrity and blocks active content like macros or OLE objects before the agent or parsers interact with the file.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 30, 2026, 09:07 AM