vitae
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's workflow includes processing untrusted external data such as existing résumé PDFs and LinkedIn profiles (Workflow Step 1 in SKILL.md). * Ingestion points: The skill accepts existing résumé PDFs and LinkedIn profile data from the user. * Boundary markers: While the skill instructs the agent to eyeball conversion results and diff against a fact sheet, it does not mandate the use of explicit delimiters or markers for the untrusted input. * Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
subprocess.run(totypstandpoppler-utils) and perform network requests viaurllib.request. * Sanitization: Instructions inSKILL.mdandats.mdguide the agent to verify facts and check for hidden text in the input to avoid obedience to embedded instructions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script
scripts/harvest_icons.pyretrieves SVG path data from the well-knownhttps://api.iconify.designservice. This is a functional requirement to include contact and platform marks without vendoring large assets, but it does involve a network request to an external service at runtime. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several validation and generation scripts (
verify.py,pick_design.py,verify_academic.py) usesubprocess.run()to execute shell commands. These scripts invoke thetypstbinary andpoppler-utilsutilities (pdfinfo,pdftotext,pdftoppm) to build and analyze documents. These operations are aligned with the skill's primary purpose and are explicitly scoped in theallowed-toolsfrontmatter.
Audit Metadata