forge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests data from external sources and the local codebase without explicit sanitization or instructions to ignore embedded prompts.\n
- Ingestion points: The
specifyphase (inreferences/specify.md) fetches data viaWebSearchandWebFetchto research prior art and standards. Theexecutephase reads existing project files.\n - Boundary markers: The skill uses structured Markdown headers (e.g.,
## Part A,## Part B) to organize context, but does not provide specific boundary markers or 'ignore instructions' delimiters for untrusted content.\n - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands through project test runners, linters, and compilers (in
references/verification.md) and can spawn subagents to perform delegated work.\n - Sanitization: No explicit filtering, escaping, or validation of externally fetched content is mentioned in the instructions.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to execute shell commands to verify code correctness, including running tests, type checkers, and linters.\n
- Evidence:
references/execute.mdandreferences/verification.mddefine a workflow where the agent runs configured project tools such asnpm test,tsc, andeslint.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses web search and fetch tools to gather information from external repositories and documentation sites during the research phase.\n - Evidence:
references/specify.mdPart A3 instructions explicitly tell the agent to useWebSearchandWebFetchto read about state-of-the-art approaches and open-source projects.
Audit Metadata