grow-app
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to suggest a global installation command (
npx skills add wondelai/skills/<slug> --global) for external dependencies. Thenpxutility downloads and executes code from remote sources, and the use of the--globalflag increases the potential impact on the host system. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the download and installation of extensions from a repository (
wondelai/skills) that does not belong to the identified author or a trusted organization. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to multiple injection vectors. First, the author identified in the metadata (
wondelai) does not match the expected author (emmavelazquez), which may mislead users about the skill's source. Second, the skill processes multiple markdown files from thedocs/directory as part of its operational logic without boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded instructions, making it vulnerable to indirect injection. - Ingestion points:
docs/GROW-APP-PLAN.md,docs/PRODUCT.md,docs/CUSTOMER.md,docs/EXPERIMENTS.md,docs/METRICS.md,docs/DESIGN.md. - Boundary markers: Not present.
- Capability inventory: Invocation of external skills, file modification, and shell command suggestion.
- Sanitization: None implemented.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes instructions to provide the user with shell commands for package management, promoting the execution of scripts from an unverified source.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata