personal-loop
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 17, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to bypass human-in-the-loop safety protocols. It mandates autonomous operation with instructions such as "never ask for input, pause for approval, or wait for a human" and "make it yourself, apply it, and log it." This suppresses the user's ability to review potentially destructive changes or command executions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a "gate-based" mechanism that executes arbitrary shell commands defined in external prompt files. The instructions state "the bar is that command exiting 0. Run it; do not judge it by eye," which forces the execution of whatever string is provided in the file without validation.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Due to the autonomous nature of the skill and its ability to execute commands and read the codebase, it could be used to exfiltrate sensitive information. A malicious instruction file in the loop directory could command the agent to read secrets or configuration files and include them in the final report or transmit them via a network request.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a large attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it treats data as instructions.
- Ingestion points: Files in the
LOOP_DIR(defaulting toloops/*.md) are loaded directly as active instructions for the agent. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or boundary markers used when the content of an external file is interpolated into the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities, including modifying the filesystem of the
TARGETdirectory, executing shell commands, and generating detailed logs. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform any sanitization or safety checks on the instructions loaded from the prompt files.
Audit Metadata