claude-code
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download installation scripts directly from
claude.ai, which is the official domain for the Claude service. - Evidence:
curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bashandirm https://claude.ai/install.ps1 | iex. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves piping a remote script to a shell interpreter (bash/PowerShell). While this pattern is often associated with risk, in this context, it is the documented and official method for installing the developer's CLI tool.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of the
claudeCLI tool using thebashtool withpty:true. It allows for one-shot prompts that can interact with the local file system and git environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by reading project files and a
CLAUDE.mdfile, which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if those files contain malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Project root directory,
src/directory, and theCLAUDE.mdconfiguration file. - Boundary markers: Uses the
-pflag for one-shot prompts to scope individual tasks. - Capability inventory: The CLI tool has the capability to edit files, execute shell commands, and automate git workflows (commit/push).
- Sanitization: The skill documentation does not specify sanitization for project file content, relying on the internal safety filters of the Claude Code CLI tool.
Audit Metadata