claude-code

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download installation scripts directly from claude.ai, which is the official domain for the Claude service.
  • Evidence: curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash and irm https://claude.ai/install.ps1 | iex.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves piping a remote script to a shell interpreter (bash/PowerShell). While this pattern is often associated with risk, in this context, it is the documented and official method for installing the developer's CLI tool.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the execution of the claude CLI tool using the bash tool with pty:true. It allows for one-shot prompts that can interact with the local file system and git environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill operates by reading project files and a CLAUDE.md file, which creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection if those files contain malicious instructions intended to influence the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Project root directory, src/ directory, and the CLAUDE.md configuration file.
  • Boundary markers: Uses the -p flag for one-shot prompts to scope individual tasks.
  • Capability inventory: The CLI tool has the capability to edit files, execute shell commands, and automate git workflows (commit/push).
  • Sanitization: The skill documentation does not specify sanitization for project file content, relying on the internal safety filters of the Claude Code CLI tool.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 8, 2026, 11:43 PM