caveman-compress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes user-provided natural language files (such as CLAUDE.md) by interpolating their content into a prompt for LLM-based compression. This creates an attack surface where instructions embedded within those files could attempt to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
read_sourcefunction inscripts/compress.pyreads file content into memory. - Boundary markers: The
build_compress_promptfunction uses aTEXT:header as a delimiter for the user content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses file read/write capabilities and the ability to execute the
claudeCLI viasubprocess.run(found inscripts/compress.py). - Sanitization: The skill implements a
mask_code_blocksfunction to protect technical content from modification and anis_sensitive_pathcheck to prevent processing files that likely contain credentials or secrets (e.g., .env, .ssh folder, or files containing 'secret' in the name). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/compress.pyusessubprocess.runto call theclaudeCLI as a fallback for compression when no ANTHROPIC_API_KEY is provided. - Evidence: The call in
scripts/compress.pyusesshutil.whichto locate the binary and passes fixed arguments (--print,--strict-mcp-config), which significantly mitigates common command injection vectors. The content is passed via stdin (input=prompt), preventing shell meta-character exploitation in arguments.
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