caveman-compress
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto invoke theclaudeCLI when an API key is not present. The implementation is secure as it avoids shell interpolation by passing arguments as a list and provides data viastdinrather than command-line arguments. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits file contents to the Anthropic API for compression. It implements a rigorous heuristic check (
is_sensitive_path) to identify and block the processing of files containing secrets, such as environment variables, SSH keys, or credential stores, ensuring sensitive data is not exfiltrated to the third-party API. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: As the skill processes natural language files through an LLM, it contains a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is read from user-provided file paths in
scripts/compress.pyvia theread_sourcefunction. - Boundary markers: The compression prompt identifies the source text with a "TEXT:" label but lacks strict structural delimiters to isolate the untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can read and write files on the local filesystem and execute the
claudebinary. - Sanitization: The skill mitigates potential injection effects using a validation engine in
scripts/validate.pythat confirms structural integrity (e.g., ensuring no code blocks or URLs were altered) before accepting the output.
Audit Metadata