senior-solution-architect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary workflow involves ingesting untrusted data from the user's local repository, creating a potential vector for indirect prompt injection if the repository contains malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Phase 1 ("Discovery & Archeology") in
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to runls -Randgrepon configuration files and directory structures to understand the tech stack. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" directives to prevent the agent from following commands potentially embedded in file names, directory names, or
package.jsondependencies. - Capability inventory: The skill requires shell access to perform its discovery functions via
lsandgrepas specified inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: There are no explicit steps provided to sanitize or validate the data retrieved from the file system before it is used to generate C4 diagrams or Architecture Decision Records (ADRs).
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill explicitly directs the agent to execute shell commands to perform repository discovery.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdcontains instructions to runls -Randgrep -r "dependencies" package.json, as well as scanning for specific infrastructure files likeDockerfile,terraform/, andk8s/.
Audit Metadata