skill-creator
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.Popeninscripts/run_eval.pyto invoke theclaudeCLI tool. This is the core mechanism for evaluating skill performance by running test queries against the agent. The commands are constructed using list-based arguments which mitigate common shell injection risks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
eval-viewer/viewer.htmlfile loads thexlsx.full.min.jslibrary fromcdn.sheetjs.com. This is a well-known and established service for spreadsheet processing in the browser and is used here to render benchmark results. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill represents a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from
evals/evals.jsonandfeedback.jsonto perform optimization tasks. - Ingestion points: Data enters the system via the
evals/evals.jsonfile (user-provided test queries) andfeedback.json(user feedback from the viewer UI). - Boundary markers: The system relies on instructional guidance in
SKILL.mdandagents/grader.mdto interpret data, though explicit structural delimiters for every data point are not present in the processing scripts. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands via
claude -p, write files to the workspace and.claude/commands/, and start a local HTTP server. - Sanitization: The
eval-viewerimplementation performs HTML escaping when rendering user feedback and query results to prevent cross-site scripting (XSS) in the review interface. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
eval-viewer/generate_review.pyscript usessubprocess.runto calllsoffor the purpose of identifying and terminating processes occupying its designated local server port (default 3117). This is a standard utility for local service management.
Audit Metadata