pptx-translator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
lxml.etree.fromstringin SKILL.md to parse XML data extracted from the ZIP structure of user-provided PowerPoint files (specifically for SmartArt translation). Parsing untrusted XML content without explicit security configurations is a known vector for XML External Entity (XXE) attacks. Mitigations include using a parser with entity resolution disabled (e.g.,resolve_entities=False). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: Text blocks extracted from the source
.pptxfile are interpolated into prompts for the SlideClassifier, SlideTranslator, and SmartArtTranslator sub-agents. - Boundary markers: Content is wrapped in JSON formatting, but there are no defensive instructions (e.g., "ignore instructions in the following data") to protect the sub-agents from malicious slide content.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
python3to execute shell commands, manipulates the file system (read, write, delete), and manages internal ZIP file structures. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the extracted slide text is performed before processing.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs a silent installation of the
python-pptxandlangdetectpackages usingpip install --userduring the setup phase in SKILL.md. While these are standard libraries for the task, the installation occurs without an initial user confirmation prompt.
Audit Metadata