claude-md-improver
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it is designed to read and evaluate the content of
CLAUDE.mdfiles from any repository, which are untrusted external inputs. - Ingestion points: The skill uses the
ReadandGlobtools to locate and ingest content fromCLAUDE.md,.claude.md, and.claude.local.mdfiles (SKILL.md, Phase 1). - Boundary markers: There are no instructions to use delimiters or to disregard potential instructions embedded within the files being audited.
- Capability inventory: The skill is configured with
BashandEdittools (SKILL.md), which provide significant system access if the agent is manipulated by injected content. - Sanitization: The skill lacks any mechanisms for sanitizing or validating the content of the files before processing them.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The assessment workflow described in
references/quality-criteria.mdinstructs the agent to 'Run documented commands (mentally or actually)' to verify their validity. If the agent utilizes itsBashtool to 'actually' run these commands, it risks executing malicious scripts that an attacker may have placed in a project's documentation.
Audit Metadata