context-compression
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted conversation history to generate structured summaries and evaluation probes, which could propagate malicious instructions into the agent's future context.
- Ingestion points: The
conversation_historyis ingested in theProbeGeneratorclass, and newly truncated content spans are processed by theStructuredSummarizerclass inscripts/compression_evaluator.py. - Boundary markers: The generated summaries and probe outputs do not utilize delimiters (such as XML tags or triple backticks) or explicit 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings to isolate the extracted history from the agent's operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: While the provided Python script does not possess dangerous capabilities like file writing, network access, or shell execution, its output is intended to drive the behavior of an agent that typically holds such privileges.
- Sanitization: Information extracted via regular expressions (e.g., decisions, file modifications) is interpolated directly into markdown templates without validation or escaping, allowing attacker-controlled data from the history to influence the summary's narrative.
Audit Metadata