automate-me

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive conversation transcripts and personal skill definitions to identify user preferences.
  • Evidence: It reads from ~/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/*.jsonl to analyze historical interactions and .claude/skills/ to locate existing configurations.
  • Guardrail: The instructions include a specific privacy rule forbidding the use of global globs, ensuring that mining is restricted to the current workspace context only.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it incorporates data from conversation transcripts into the logic of newly generated skills.
  • Ingestion points: Transcript files in ~/.claude/projects/ containing arbitrary user and agent text.
  • Boundary markers: Not specified for the mining process.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can create or modify files, perform Git operations, and open Pull Requests.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is described for the patterns extracted from transcripts before they are used to draft the final skill.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: System commands are used to manage files and retrieve project metadata.
  • Evidence: The skill executes git log to identify when files were last modified and utilizes Git worktrees and commits to finalize changes.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 17, 2026, 01:55 AM