automate-me
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE_AND_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive conversation transcripts and personal skill definitions to identify user preferences.
- Evidence: It reads from
~/.claude/projects/<encoded-cwd>/*.jsonlto analyze historical interactions and.claude/skills/to locate existing configurations. - Guardrail: The instructions include a specific privacy rule forbidding the use of global globs, ensuring that mining is restricted to the current workspace context only.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it incorporates data from conversation transcripts into the logic of newly generated skills.
- Ingestion points: Transcript files in
~/.claude/projects/containing arbitrary user and agent text. - Boundary markers: Not specified for the mining process.
- Capability inventory: The skill can create or modify files, perform Git operations, and open Pull Requests.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is described for the patterns extracted from transcripts before they are used to draft the final skill.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: System commands are used to manage files and retrieve project metadata.
- Evidence: The skill executes
git logto identify when files were last modified and utilizes Git worktrees and commits to finalize changes.
Audit Metadata