self-improving-agent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/improve.pyusessubprocess.runto executegit remote get-url origin. This is used for environment discovery to automatically determine the project name for rule categorization. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection and Agent Poisoning. It is designed to capture user feedback and corrections, then write them into persistent instruction files (
AGENTS.md) that influence the agent's future behavior. There is no sanitization or validation of the content being recorded. - Ingestion points: Arbitrary strings from user messages are captured via the
observecommand inscripts/improve.py. - Boundary markers: The rules are written as bullet points in markdown files without specific delimiters or instructions to treat them as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write to the global agent configuration (
~/.config/opencode/AGENTS.md) and project-local instructions. This means a single malicious correction could persistently affect the agent's behavior across all projects. - Sanitization: No filtering or escaping is performed on the rule text. A user (or an attacker providing data the user copies) could provide a 'correction' that contains malicious system instructions, which the agent would then permanently adopt.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The
seedcommand inscripts/improve.pyparses external markdown files and imports lines as rules. This provides an additional vector for ingesting untrusted instructions into the agent's persistent rule set.
Audit Metadata