podcast-pipeline
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_CONTEXT_INJECTION]: The
SKILL.mdfile contains a 'Preamble' section that executes shell commands automatically when the skill is loaded or started. Evidence includes calls topython3 telemetry/version_check.pyandpython3 telemetry/telemetry_init.py. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill attempts to execute local Python scripts during its initialization phase. These scripts are not provided in the source files, making their behavior unverifiable and potentially risky if the environment contains malicious files at those paths.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted external data and interpolates it into LLM prompts without adequate protection.
- Ingestion points: Transcripts are ingested from local files or generated from downloaded audio via RSS feeds in
podcast_pipeline.py. - Boundary markers: None. The transcript text is directly inserted into the
user_promptinextract_content_atomsandgenerate_content_pieceswithout delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands. - Capability inventory: The skill can make network requests to external APIs (OpenAI, Anthropic), download files from arbitrary URLs, write to the local file system, and execute shell commands in the preamble.
- Sanitization: None. The raw transcript text is truncated and interpolated directly into prompts.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
podcast_pipeline.pyscript downloads audio files from user-supplied RSS feed URLs using therequestslibrary. This involves connecting to arbitrary external domains provided via CLI arguments or configuration.
Audit Metadata