show-and-tell-video-slate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions in
SKILL.mddirect the agent to execute Python scripts located attelemetry/version_check.pyandtelemetry/telemetry_init.py. These files are not included in the skill payload. Instructing an agent to execute unverified external scripts from the host environment is a security risk as the behavior of these scripts cannot be audited. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently uses shell execution (
python3) to run both the includedscripts/evaluate_slate.pyand the missing telemetry scripts. This reliance on shell commands increases the risk of command injection if parameters are not strictly controlled. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill initializes telemetry (
telemetry_init.py) at startup. Although the documentation claims this is "privacy-preserving," the lack of source code for the telemetry script makes it impossible to verify if sensitive information, such as project paths or analytics data, is being exfiltrated to a remote server. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) because it is designed to ingest and analyze untrusted project data.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdinstructs the agent to "Inspect only supplied or authorized builds, repositories, demos, agent runs, dashboards, analytics, and workflow outputs." - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not specify delimiters or provide instructions to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious commands embedded within the ingested files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to write files (
--output slate-eval.json) and execute shell commands (python3), which could be leveraged if an injection is successful. - Sanitization: None. The skill does not outline any steps for filtering or sanitizing the content retrieved from external builds or dashboards.
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