continuous-learning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to 'harvest' lessons from the conversation context and persist them into 'durable memory' surfaces such as
CLAUDE.md,user-profile.md, or individual skill definitions. This creates a vulnerability surface where malicious instructions embedded in untrusted data (like web content or code comments processed during a task) can be promoted into permanent, high-privilege system instructions. - Ingestion points: The skill explicitly ingests data from the current chat history in its 'Harvest' step (Step 1) to identify errors, corrections, or surprises.
- Boundary markers: While the skill uses a 'situation-tagged entry format' (Step 4) to provide structure, it lacks explicit instructions to sanitize or valid inputs for prompt injection markers that might attempt to hijack the agent's future behavior.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to modify the root
CLAUDE.md(a core instruction file for many agents),02-DOCS/wiki/harness/user-profile.md, and02-DOCS/wiki/harness/decisions.md. It also delegates structural changes to other skills viaauthor-skill, allowing it to modify tool logic or validation scripts. - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or strict schema validation is mentioned for the content harvested from the chat before it is written to the durable surfaces.
Audit Metadata