sdd
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted user feature ideas and reads local profile data to determine communication registers.
- Ingestion points: User prompts (feature intent) and
02-DOCS/wiki/harness/user-profile.md. - Boundary markers: The skill enforces an "artifact is the contract" rule, requiring human approval of specifications and plans before any code is written.
- Capability inventory: File writing to
02-DOCS/wiki/sdd/, subagent dispatching via the platform'sTasktool, and Git operations (PR creation/merging). - Sanitization: Content is gated by ordered development phases; "Autopilot" mode, which reduces per-phase stops, is explicitly prohibited from performing destructive or outward-facing actions (merging, secret management, or deleting) without human intervention.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a model routing protocol that dynamically delegates development phases to specific model tiers (heavy, balanced, or light) resolved from a project configuration file.
- Mechanism: Programmatic dispatching of subagents using platform-specific delegation tools (e.g., Claude Code's Task tool).
- Constraints: This behavior is disabled by default (
models.enabled: false) and requires local configuration in02-DOCS/wiki/sdd/config.yaml. It is limited to resolving predefined model IDs for development tasks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill coordinates code implementation and shipping via sibling skills, enforcing project-wide authorship standards.
- The
shipphase enforces specific Git authorship ('Eric'), which aligns with the authorized vendor context ('ericrisco'), and prevents the inclusion of automated footers or co-authorship metadata that could misrepresent code provenance.
Audit Metadata