perfect-web-clone
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted HTML and CSS data from arbitrary external URLs and includes it in the context for code generation subagents.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/extract_page.pyscript fetches raw DOM and computed style data from user-provided URLs and saves it topage_data.json. - Boundary markers: The prompt template for subagents in
SKILL.mdlacks explicit delimiters or specific instructions to disregard agent-like directives that might be embedded in the webpage's source code. - Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to write components to the local filesystem (
src/components/), use theTasktool for orchestration, and execute development commands likenpm install. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the extracted HTML content is performed before it is passed to the subagents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Python scripts and shell commands to perform extraction, chunking, and environment setup.
- Evidence: The workflow in
SKILL.mdinvolves runningpython scripts/extract_page.pyandpython scripts/chunk_content.py. The setup process involves runningpip installand browser installation commands. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads browser binaries and Python packages from official registries and well-known services.
- Evidence: The
README.mdandscripts/setup.shinstruct the user to install dependencies from the official Python package registry and fetch the Chromium browser via the Playwright CLI. It also utilizes the officialanthropicsGitHub repository for installation.
Audit Metadata