skills/espennilsen/pi/pdf-reader/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pdf-reader

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 21, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF data from local paths or remote URLs which serves as an ingestion point for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: PDFs are downloaded from user-provided URLs as described in SKILL.md or read from local paths using the scripts/extract.py utility.
  • Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions for the agent to treat the extracted PDF content as untrusted data or use delimiters to prevent content from being interpreted as instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell execution (curl, pdftotext, pdfinfo, tesseract), file read/write permissions (specifically in the /tmp/ directory), and python execution via the provided scripts/extract.py script.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or filtering is performed on the text extracted from the PDF before it is presented to the agent's context.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent to download PDF files from arbitrary URLs using curl to the /tmp/ directory for subsequent processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing multiple external CLI tools including pdftotext, pdfinfo, pdfimages, pdffonts, and tesseract to perform its primary functions, which is expected for the stated purpose but represents a tool-based execution surface.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 21, 2026, 09:26 AM