code-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from code diffs and GitHub issue/PR bodies, which are passed directly into sub-agent prompts. This allows malicious instructions in the code or issue descriptions to potentially manipulate the sub-agents' review findings.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads diff output via
git diffand fetches external content usinggh issue viewandgh pr viewas described inSKILL.md.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions for the Standards, Spec, Simplification, and Optimization sub-agents lack explicit delimiters or "ignore" instructions to prevent the model from obeying embedded commands in the diff or spec data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill executes read-only
gitandghcommands and reads local documentation. It does not have file-writing capabilities or the ability to make arbitrary network requests.\n - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the content from the diff or the GitHub CLI is mentioned before it is interpolated into prompts.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using variables derived from sources that can be influenced by users or attackers.\n
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, the<fixed-point>argument forgit diffandgit rev-parseis provided by the user. Furthermore, the issue<number>used ingh issue viewis extracted from commit messages, which are part of the repository data and could contain shell metacharacters for command injection.
Audit Metadata