code-review

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted content from code diffs and GitHub issue/PR bodies, which are passed directly into sub-agent prompts. This allows malicious instructions in the code or issue descriptions to potentially manipulate the sub-agents' review findings.\n
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads diff output via git diff and fetches external content using gh issue view and gh pr view as described in SKILL.md.\n
  • Boundary markers: The instructions for the Standards, Spec, Simplification, and Optimization sub-agents lack explicit delimiters or "ignore" instructions to prevent the model from obeying embedded commands in the diff or spec data.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes read-only git and gh commands and reads local documentation. It does not have file-writing capabilities or the ability to make arbitrary network requests.\n
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of the content from the diff or the GitHub CLI is mentioned before it is interpolated into prompts.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using variables derived from sources that can be influenced by users or attackers.\n
  • Evidence: In SKILL.md, the <fixed-point> argument for git diff and git rev-parse is provided by the user. Furthermore, the issue <number> used in gh issue view is extracted from commit messages, which are part of the repository data and could contain shell metacharacters for command injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 22, 2026, 01:41 PM