skills/eszxcvfd/skills/impeccable/Gen Agent Trust Hub

impeccable

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of execFileSync, spawn, and execFile to run local utilities like git and node. Crucially, in scripts/live-copy-edit-agent.mjs, it invokes the codex CLI with the --dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox flag to automate source code edits. While intended for its 'Manual Edit Apply' feature, this represents a significant privilege level.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to https://impeccable.style/api/roll and https://impeccable.style/api/chosen to fetch design directions and record telemetry. It also contacts https://api.openai.com for image generation. While these are known services for the tool's ecosystem, they involve external data exchange.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically loads modules from the user's project node_modules directory. In scripts/live/svelte-ast.mjs, it uses createRequire on the project's package.json path to load the Svelte compiler (svelte/compiler). This dynamic loading from computed paths is a medium-severity pattern used here to analyze the project's own frontend code.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Telemetry and 'concept rolls' are fetched from impeccable.style. Although the script documentation claims no sensitive project data or conversation context is transmitted, the network activity to a non-whitelisted domain is a notable finding.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Static analysis identified a pattern in reference/craft.md regarding action concealment. However, this appears to be a false positive related to UI terminology guidance (instructing the agent to use natural language instead of technical aliases), rather than an attempt to hide malicious behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Aug 8, 2026, 01:03 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — impeccable