impeccable
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 8, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of
execFileSync,spawn, andexecFileto run local utilities likegitandnode. Crucially, inscripts/live-copy-edit-agent.mjs, it invokes thecodexCLI with the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag to automate source code edits. While intended for its 'Manual Edit Apply' feature, this represents a significant privilege level. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to
https://impeccable.style/api/rollandhttps://impeccable.style/api/chosento fetch design directions and record telemetry. It also contactshttps://api.openai.comfor image generation. While these are known services for the tool's ecosystem, they involve external data exchange. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically loads modules from the user's project
node_modulesdirectory. Inscripts/live/svelte-ast.mjs, it usescreateRequireon the project'spackage.jsonpath to load the Svelte compiler (svelte/compiler). This dynamic loading from computed paths is a medium-severity pattern used here to analyze the project's own frontend code. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Telemetry and 'concept rolls' are fetched from
impeccable.style. Although the script documentation claims no sensitive project data or conversation context is transmitted, the network activity to a non-whitelisted domain is a notable finding. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Static analysis identified a pattern in
reference/craft.mdregarding action concealment. However, this appears to be a false positive related to UI terminology guidance (instructing the agent to use natural language instead of technical aliases), rather than an attempt to hide malicious behavior.
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