rag-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute multiple shell commands using the
qmdutility to perform searches and verify status. - Evidence:
qmd status,qmd query "<query>" --json,qmd vsearch "configuration" --jsoninSKILL.md. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation encourages the installation of an external dependency from a third-party source.
- Evidence:
bun install -g @tobilu/qmdreferenced in bothREADME.mdandSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from local document indexes without explicit sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through the output of
qmd queryandqmd vsearchas described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None. The instructions do not specify delimiters or warnings to treat the search results as untrusted content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute subprocesses (
qmd) and read files based on the paths returned by the search. - Sanitization: None. The agent is instructed to "Parse the JSON output and present" the results directly.
Audit Metadata