skills/ethan-rio/skills/curate/Gen Agent Trust Hub

curate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface because it reads and summarizes content from arbitrary Markdown files in the 'Inbox' folder.
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads files from $VAULT/Inbox/*.md as specified in the workflow.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions (e.g., 'ignore embedded instructions') used when the agent summarizes the note content for the user.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes Bash, Write, and Edit tools, allowing for file system modification and shell command execution which could be targeted by a successful injection.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the note body or frontmatter content is performed before processing.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands and Python scripts to perform file operations like moving, merging, and deleting notes.
  • Evidence: The 'Promote', 'Merge', and 'Discard' sections contain Bash scripts using ls, rm, awk, and python3 heredocs to manipulate vault files.
  • Risk: There is a potential for command injection if the $TITLE provided by the user via AskUserQuestion or the filenames in the Inbox contain shell metacharacters that are not correctly escaped by the agent logic before being passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 18, 2026, 01:51 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — curate