candidate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell piping pattern to commit state changes:
echo '<transaction-json>' | <plugin-root>/scripts/state-commit. The content of<transaction-json>is dynamically constructed using inputs such as--branchand--commit. If these inputs are not properly sanitized, they could be used to inject malicious shell commands through metacharacters or subshell expansion. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes data from external state files to make logic decisions.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
.agent-atelier/loop-state.jsonand.agent-atelier/work-items.jsonto validate status transitions and queue positions. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are defined to isolate untrusted data from the agent's instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bashfor command execution andReadfor file system access. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for the data ingested from the state files before it is processed or used in shell command construction.
Audit Metadata