candidate

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a shell piping pattern to commit state changes: echo '<transaction-json>' | <plugin-root>/scripts/state-commit. The content of <transaction-json> is dynamically constructed using inputs such as --branch and --commit. If these inputs are not properly sanitized, they could be used to inject malicious shell commands through metacharacters or subshell expansion.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it processes data from external state files to make logic decisions.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads .agent-atelier/loop-state.json and .agent-atelier/work-items.json to validate status transitions and queue positions.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or boundary markers are defined to isolate untrusted data from the agent's instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to Bash for command execution and Read for file system access.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for the data ingested from the state files before it is processed or used in shell command construction.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 10, 2026, 05:44 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — candidate