setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill modifies the project's
.claude/settings.jsonfile to automatically grant permissions forBash(*/knowledge-gate:*)andBash(sqlite3 .knowledge/vault.db:*). This allows the agent to execute these commands in subsequent sessions without requesting user confirmation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill generates GitHub Workflows that fetch the Knowledge Distillery plugin from the author's repository at
github.com/ether-moon/knowledge-distilleryand download various MCP server packages from the npm registry. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Automated workflows created by the skill execute code directly from the author's repository and run third-party packages dynamically using
npx(e.g.,mcp-linear,@modelcontextprotocol/server-slack). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an indirect prompt injection surface through the
batch-refine.ymlandcurate-report.ymlworkflows which ingest untrusted data from the repository environment. - Ingestion points: Pull Request bodies, commit metadata, and issue/PR comments are processed by the agent within the workflow.
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the workflow prompt templates.
- Capability inventory: The workflows grant the agent access to file system operations, terminal execution (
Bash), and multiple MCP integrations (GitHub, Linear, Slack, Notion). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested PR data is performed before it is passed to the LLM.
Audit Metadata