consulting-peer-llms
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The bundled shell script
scripts/peer-review.shallows for the execution of arbitrary binaries. While intended to wrap specific LLM CLIs, theexecute_clifunction includes a fallback case that executes any command name passed as an argument if it is found in the system's execution path. - Evidence: In
scripts/peer-review.sh, theexecute_clifunction contains a*)case that runsrun_cmd "$cli" "$prompt". The$clivariable is derived directly from the arguments passed to the script'sexecutecommand by the agent. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill transmits repository context, including git diffs and file contents, to well-known external LLM services (Gemini, Codex, and Claude) via their respective CLI tools for the purpose of code review.
- Evidence: The workflow in
SKILL.mdand the prompt templates inreference/prompt-template.mdexplicitly instruct the agent to provide the external tools with access to the repository's git history and file contents. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing "raw responses" from external LLM tools. These responses are synthesized into a final report which then influences subsequent agent actions, such as auto-fixing code via other skills.
- Ingestion points: The agent reads raw output from
/tmp/*.txtfiles generated by external tools as described inSKILL.md(Step 3) andreference/cli-commands.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions provided to the synthesis logic to ignore potential command-like instructions embedded within the peer LLM reviews.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
Bashtool to executescripts/peer-review.shand perform repository modifications. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill catenates and processes raw external output for synthesis without filtering or escaping content.
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