managing-git-workflow
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a potential surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from git history and file changes to generate natural language outputs.\n
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external data using
git status,git log, andgit diffas described inreference/commit.md,reference/pr.md, andreference/push.md.\n - Boundary markers: While the agent is instructed to match project styles and extract specific ticket patterns, the instructions do not include explicit boundary markers or directives to ignore instructions that might be embedded within the files or commit logs being analyzed.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to write-enabled tools including
git commit,git push, andgh pr create.\n - Sanitization: The implementation consistently uses
HEREDOCsyntax (cat <<'EOF') within shell commands to prevent the generated message or PR content from being executed as shell code, which mitigates direct command injection risks at the execution layer.
Audit Metadata