diffdock
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/workflows_examples.mddirect the user to clone the DiffDock repository fromgithub.com/gcorso/DiffDock.gitand pull a Docker image fromrbgcsail/diffdock. These sources are outside the provided trusted vendor list and represent external code dependencies. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/setup_check.pyutility uses the__import__function to dynamically check for the presence of required Python libraries. Although the library names are sourced from a static internal list, this is a form of dynamic module loading at runtime. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted protein structure data (PDB) and ligand descriptions (SMILES) which are interpolated into
Bashcommands for docking inference. This creates a potential attack surface for command injection if the input data contains shell metacharacters. - Ingestion points: The
protein_path,ligand_description, andprotein_sequencefields inSKILL.mdworkflows and the CSV files processed byscripts/prepare_batch_csv.py. - Boundary markers: None identified in the prompt instructions to delineate untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Bashtool to executepython -m inferenceand several local helper scripts. - Sanitization:
scripts/prepare_batch_csv.pyperforms basic SMILES validation using RDKit and checks for the existence of local protein files, but does not perform shell-safe escaping. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the
Bashtool to perform environment checks, run molecular docking models, and execute results analysis scripts.
Audit Metadata