modal
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documents functions (FastAPI endpoints, scrapers) that ingest external data, creating a potential surface for indirect injection if data is processed by an LLM without adequate protection.
- Ingestion points: Data ingestion occurs in code examples for
scrape_url,api(request), andembed(request)withinreferences/examples.md. - Boundary markers: The provided templates do not include specific prompt delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The platform offers
subprocess.run,subprocess.Popen, andmodal.Sandbox.execcapabilities for executing code in containers. - Sanitization: The skill includes clear security warnings in
SKILL.mdand reference files, advising the use ofmodal.Sandboxfor untrusted code and recommending hardcoded argument lists to prevent command injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands and subprocess calls for platform features and specialized task launchers.
- Evidence:
references/gpu.mdandreferences/web-endpoints.mddemonstrate usingsubprocess.runandsubprocess.Popenfor tools like Hugging Face Accelerate, vLLM, and PyTorch training scripts. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches container images, Python packages, and model weights from well-known registries and trusted services.
- Evidence: Fetches Python packages from PyPI using
uv, pulls container base images from Docker Hub, and retrieves model weights from Hugging Face repositories. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill provides features for dynamic code execution as part of its core serverless functionality.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdandreferences/api_reference.mddocumentrun_functionfor executing Python code during image builds andmodal.Sandboxfor programmatically executing dynamically generated code in isolated environments.
Audit Metadata