pydicom
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process DICOM files, which are untrusted external binary data. This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection or structural exploits if the underlying parser or processing scripts are vulnerable to maliciously crafted files.
- Ingestion points: The
pydicom.dcmread()function is used inSKILL.md,scripts/anonymize_dicom.py,scripts/dicom_to_image.py, andscripts/extract_metadata.pyto parse external files. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or delimiters are used to separate untrusted data from processing logic in the examples provided.
- Capability inventory: The skill has capabilities to write to the file system (
ds.save_as,image.save) and modify the environment via package installation. - Sanitization: While an anonymization script (
scripts/anonymize_dicom.py) is provided to remove Protected Health Information (PHI) from metadata, there is no evidence of sanitization against structural or binary-level exploits within the DICOM format itself. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The instructions include commands to download and install several external Python libraries from public registries.
- Evidence: Installation instructions for
pydicom,pillow,numpy,matplotlib,pylibjpeg,pylibjpeg-libjpeg,pylibjpeg-openjpeg, andpython-gdcmusinguv pip install. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user and agent to execute shell commands for library installation and for running utility scripts.
- Evidence: Shell commands for
uv pip installand script execution (e.g.,python scripts/anonymize_dicom.py) are documented throughoutSKILL.mdand script headers.
Audit Metadata