logistics-exception-management
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGNO_CODE
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process data from external, untrusted sources which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The skill instructions specify that the agent will interact with and process data from "TMS (transportation management), WMS (warehouse management), carrier portals, claims management platforms, and ERP order management" (SKILL.md).
- Boundary markers: The skill does not provide explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to distinguish between its primary directives and the content of the logistics documents or carrier communications it processes.
- Capability inventory: As the YAML frontmatter does not restrict tools via the
allowed-toolsfield, the agent retains its default capabilities, which may include file system access and shell command execution to manage claims and documentation. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the content retrieved from external carrier portals or shipment logs.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a minor inconsistency in the skill's metadata; the frontmatter identifies the author as "evos" and references a repository under "affaan-m," while the skill is attributed to "eugene-ee" in the distribution context. This lack of consistency can complicate the verification of the skill's origin.
- [NO_CODE]: The skill is comprised solely of markdown documentation, templates, and decision frameworks. It does not contain any scripts, binaries, or automated installation commands.
Audit Metadata