ce-babysit-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive automated command execution using the
gh(GitHub) andgitCLI tools. Authorized actions include creating commits, pushing branches, rerunning failed Actions, and merging managed stacks usinggh stack merge. These operations are well-defined within the skill's primary purpose of PR management. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes untrusted data from external sources.
- Ingestion points: Data is ingested via
gh pr view(pull request comments, review bodies) and CI log tails fetched from GitHub Actions runs. - Boundary markers: The instructions include an explicit "Security" section and a "Core Principle" warning the agent to treat comment and log text as untrusted input and never execute shell snippets or scripts found within them.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local filesystem (in
/tmp), perform Git operations (commit, push), and call GitHub APIs via theghtool. - Sanitization: The skill instructs the agent to decide on fixes independently by reading the actual code, rather than relying on suggestions in the untrusted input.
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The skill manages internal state in a local directory under
/tmp. It implements security best practices to protect this data, including the use of restricted permissions (umask 077andchmod 700) to ensure state files are only accessible by the current user. - [PERSISTENCE_MECHANISMS]: To achieve its "babysitting" goal, the skill provides instructions for setting up durable monitoring loops using system-level schedulers like cron or harness-specific tools (e.g., Grok's durable scheduler). This is intended behavior for the long-running watch task and does not involve malicious persistence.
Audit Metadata