ce-brainstorm
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several internal scripts to perform its operations. These include
packs-resolve.pyfor configuration management,peer-job-runner.pyfor process supervision, andlight-webserver.jsfor serving visual mockups. These scripts are executed as local sub-processes by the agent.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: To handle computationally expensive reasoning tasks, the skill dispatches work to the Claude CLI using theelevation-dispatch.shscript. This process is designed with security in mind, explicitly restricting the model's access to a read-only set of tools and a specific handoff directory.\n- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill includes a background task manager (peer-job-runner.py) that uses platform-specific techniques, such as double-forking on POSIX and Job Objects on Windows, to allow long-running operations to continue independently of the agent's main session lifecycle.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill explores data from the local repository and Slack, which potentially introduces a surface for indirect prompt injection. However, the skill explicitly instructs the agent to treat this external context as untrusted data and applies strict tool restrictions to model-elevation calls to mitigate risk.
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