ce-plan
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes specialized scripts to launch and supervise processes.
scripts/peer-job-runner.pyis a detached process manager that executes arbitrary command-line arguments (argv) provided by the agent.scripts/elevation-dispatch.shexecutes theclaudeCLI to perform reasoning-heavy tasks, although it incorporates security flags such as--safe-modeand restricted--tools.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill can fetch and process external content.
scripts/packs-resolve.pyidentifies and clones external Git repositories (referred to as 'Compound Packs') usinggit cloneorgit fetchbased on URLs provided in repository configuration files (config.yaml).- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The planning workflow is designed to ingest and process data from multiple external surfaces, which constitutes an attack surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: Research findings are aggregated from the web (via
web-researcher.md), Slack conversations (viaslack-researcher.md), and external Git repositories (vialearnings-researcher.md). - Boundary markers: The
references/reasoning-elevation.mdfile contains explicit instructions for the agent to treat research dossiers and dialogue history as 'untrusted data' that must be interpreted rather than followed as instructions. - Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands through
peer-job-runner.pyand manage files across the project workspace. - Sanitization: Instructions in
references/reasoning-elevation.mdrequire the orchestrating model to validate the output returned from elevated reasoning steps to ensure it is a valid plan and not malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata