ce-retune
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from past run archives and arbitrary corpus prose without explicit sanitization or boundary markers.
- Ingestion points: In Phase 1 (
references/baseline-mining.md), the agent extracts thefinal_messagefrom logs. In Phase 3 (references/corpus-audit.md), it reads the entire corpus directory for auditing. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when ingesting this external content into the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to spawn sub-agents (
references/workflow-shapes.md) and perform file system writes (references/cut-passes.md). - Sanitization: There is no mention of filtering or escaping extracted prose before it is processed by secondary agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on the execution of local shell utilities and the creation of custom scripts for data extraction and duplicate detection.
- Evidence: The skill uses
git log -Sfor provenance tracking (references/corpus-audit.md) and a shell pipeline involvingfindandshasumfor identifying shared assets (references/cut-passes.md). - Context: These actions are consistent with the skill's primary purpose as a measurement-first tuning utility and are intended to be performed on local development artifacts.
Audit Metadata