polygres-data-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runinscripts/check_embedding_device.pyandscripts/check_env.pyto inspect system hardware and verify environment configuration. These calls target standard utilities such assysctl,vm_stat,nvidia-smi, andgitwith hardcoded arguments, ensuring they are used only for local diagnostic purposes.- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Automated detectors flagged HTTP requests inscripts/check_embedding_device.py. Analysis shows these calls useurllib.request.urlopensolely to query local loopback addresses (localhost,127.0.0.1) for Ollama and llama.cpp model catalogs. These interactions are restricted to local discovery and do not facilitate remote code execution from untrusted sources.- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]:scripts/scaffold_pipeline.pycreates local support files by copying existing assets from the skill directory. The generated scripts rely on reputable Python packages such assentence-transformersand do not perform unsafe operations like arbitrary code evaluation or runtime injection.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest data from external files and APIs. It mitigates injection risks by defining ingestion points in specific playbooks, recommending the use of privacy filters and stable source identifiers, and requiring a consolidated review of all planned mutations before they are executed. This evidence chain provides sufficient controls for handling untrusted content during pipeline setup.
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