coolify-cli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 25, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to install the Coolify CLI by piping remote scripts directly to the shell (
curl | bashandirm | iex). This pattern is high risk as it executes unverified code from an external repository. - Evidence in
SKILL.md:curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coollabsio/coolify-cli/main/scripts/install.sh | bash - Evidence in
SKILL.md:irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coollabsio/coolify-cli/main/scripts/install.ps1 | iex - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to access and upload sensitive local files, specifically private SSH keys, to the remote service.
- Evidence in
SKILL.mdandreferences/command-reference.md:coolify private-key add --name deploy-key --file ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed around executing arbitrary shell commands via the Coolify CLI to manage infrastructure, which provides a broad attack surface for server manipulation.
- Evidence: Extensive use of the
coolifycommand across all instruction files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes external
.envfiles which could contain malicious instructions designed to influence the agent's behavior during synchronization tasks. - Ingestion points: Local
.envfiles viacoolify app env sync --file .env(referenced inreferences/command-reference.md). - Boundary markers: None mentioned.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess calls via CLI, file system access, and network operations.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the file content is described.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://raw.githubusercontent.com/coollabsio/coolify-cli/main/scripts/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata