http-request
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill's network configuration explicitly disables private IP blocking (
block_private_ips: falseinSKILL.md). This allows the agent to reach internal network resources, loopback addresses, or cloud metadata services (e.g.,169.254.169.254), potentially exposing sensitive internal data or credentials if the agent is running in a cloud-hosted environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection because its primary purpose is to ingest untrusted data from the internet.
- Ingestion points: The
urlparameter allows fetching content from any attacker-controlled website. - Capability inventory: The skill performs network GET/POST requests and returns the response body directly to the agent's context (often after Markdown conversion in
scripts/main.py). - Boundary markers: The script does not wrap the fetched content in protective delimiters or provide instructions to the agent to ignore potential commands embedded in the data.
- Sanitization: While it uses
html2textfor formatting, it does not filter or sanitize the content for malicious natural language instructions designed to manipulate the agent. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a 'Legacy SSL' feature in
scripts/main.pyby manually setting theOP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECTflag (0x4) in the SSL context. This downgrades connection security by allowing unsafe legacy renegotiation, which increases vulnerability to certain Man-in-the-Middle attacks, although it is presented as a compatibility feature.
Audit Metadata