gen-release-notes

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 26, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directly interpolates the $ARGUMENTS variable into shell command strings in SKILL.md. If a user provides a crafted input containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &, |, or backticks), it can lead to arbitrary command execution on the underlying system.
  • Evidence: PREV_TAG="$ARGUMENTS" is used in multiple subsequent commands: git tag -l "$PREV_TAG", git log ${PREV_TAG}..HEAD, and git diff ${PREV_TAG}..HEAD.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from the git repository's history and pull request metadata.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads data from git log and gh pr list in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or protective delimiters are used when the agent processes the retrieved commit messages or PR titles.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (git, gh) and perform file system writes (CHANGELOG.md).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation is applied to the ingested commit messages or PR descriptions before they are used to generate the changelog or presented to the agent context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 26, 2026, 05:53 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gen-release-notes