gen-release-notes
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill directly interpolates the
$ARGUMENTSvariable into shell command strings inSKILL.md. If a user provides a crafted input containing shell metacharacters (e.g.,;,&,|, or backticks), it can lead to arbitrary command execution on the underlying system. - Evidence:
PREV_TAG="$ARGUMENTS"is used in multiple subsequent commands:git tag -l "$PREV_TAG",git log ${PREV_TAG}..HEAD, andgit diff ${PREV_TAG}..HEAD. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from the git repository's history and pull request metadata.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads data from
git logandgh pr listinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or protective delimiters are used when the agent processes the retrieved commit messages or PR titles.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands (
git,gh) and perform file system writes (CHANGELOG.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or validation is applied to the ingested commit messages or PR descriptions before they are used to generate the changelog or presented to the agent context.
Audit Metadata