browser-extension-builder
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 5, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions recommend that the agent download a favicon from a user-specified or brand-related URL (e.g., https://company.com/favicon.ico) to the local
/tmpdirectory. This pattern involves retrieving content from untrusted remote sources determined by the user's prompt. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a command-line workflow for the agent to execute, using
curlto download a remote file followed by apython3script to process that file using thePIL(Pillow) library. While intended for extracting brand colors, processing untrusted remote files with image libraries can be exploited if the library has unpatched vulnerabilities. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The generated browser extension is designed to ingest and scrape data from LinkedIn profiles (name, headline, photo). This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where a malicious profile could attempt to influence the extension's behavior or output, although the script includes
escapeHtmlto mitigate basic injection attacks. - [SAFE]: The extension template demonstrates good security practices by storing API keys in
chrome.storage.localand restricting sensitive API calls to the background service worker, ensuring credentials are not exposed to the content script or the web page DOM.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://company.com/favicon.ico - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata