contact-research
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads the
@vibeprospecting/vpaipackage from the public npm registry during initialization and execution phases using thenpxcommand. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to execute
npx @vibeprospecting/vpai@latest, which fetches and runs remote code at runtime. Using the@latesttag means the executed code version is unpinned and could change between runs. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on multiple shell commands to perform its core functions, including matching prospects (
match-prospects), enriching data (enrich-prospects), and fetching career events (fetch-prospects-events). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests data from external sources and processes it into natural language synopses.
- Ingestion points: Enriched profile data and career events fetched from the Vibe Prospecting API and saved in
people-enriched.csv(as described in Phase 4 and 5). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define any boundary markers or delimiters to separate the external data from the agent's instructions during the synopsis generation phase.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for shell command execution (via
npx) and local file system access (reading and writing CSV files). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the data retrieved from the external enrichment API before it is passed to the language model for synthesis.
Audit Metadata