eas-app-stores
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill documentation outlines a process for managing App Store metadata using dynamic JavaScript configuration files (
store.config.js). This approach allows the inclusion of data fetched from external APIs, which creates a surface for tool output poisoning if the remote data source contains malicious instructions.\n - Ingestion points:
references/app-store-metadata.md(viafetch()calls within configuration scripts).\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the documentation provides examples of fetching external content without specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
eas-clifor high-privilege operations, including binary uploads and metadata updates to production app stores as described inSKILL.md.\n - Sanitization: Absent; the provided examples do not include validation or sanitization logic for content retrieved from external localization services.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to download and execute the
submit-expo-feedbackpackage usingnpx --yes. This pattern involves the runtime execution of code retrieved directly from the npm registry.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill involves downloading theeas-cliutility and suggests fetching external resources for metadata configuration. These downloads are associated with the vendor's official deployment tooling.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on several CLI utilities, includingeas,npx,plutil, andsips, to perform build verification, metadata updates, and storefront submissions.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The use ofstore.config.jsallows for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript to dynamically generate configuration values or fetch translations at runtime, which is a standard but powerful feature of the EAS metadata tool.
Audit Metadata